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In October 2018, the World Bank (the Bank) has launched an upgraded version of its safeguard 
policies, the Environmental and Social Framework (ESF). It took over six years of discussions, 
hundreds of consultation meetings, thousands of pages of commentary and exchange, and 
extensive preparations for implementation, for the ESF to be introduced. For the Bank this is one 
of the largest internal reforms in decades, affecting its operations in over 100 countries with the 
annual lending volume of 45 billion USD (Dann & Riegner). In the field of development 
cooperation at large, consultations over the ESF triggered a major debate about how to ensure the 
sustainability and fairness of development operations, whilst also respecting the national 
autonomy of the borrowing states. It goes without saying that many of the changes introduced by 
this reform, as well as the process through which the ESF was adopted, have direct relevance to 
public international law, particularly in the areas of environmental, labour and human rights’ 
protection. However, given the recent nature of these developments, thus far there has been a 
limited academic engagement with this topic, especially from a legal perspective1. Therefore, 
                                                          
1 See for instance, S. de Moerloose, ‘Sustainable Development and the Use of Borrowing State 
Frameworks in the New World Bank Safeguards’, (2018) 51 (1) Law and Politics in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America 53; G. Jokubauskaite, ‘The Legal Nature of the World Bank Safeguards’ (2018) 51 
(1) Law and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin America 78; C. Passoni, A. Rosenbaum and E. Vermuni, 
2 
 
building on the discussions that first took place among the authors at the University of Durham 
(UK) in September 2017, the papers in this Symposium highlight the impacts that the ESF is 
likely to have on the functioning of international legal framework.  
   
In order to understand the impacts of the ESF on the international legal order, one must 
understand how this framework operates. As the name suggests, the safeguards aim to protect a 
natural environment and local populations from the negative effects of development financing. In 
order to achieve this aim, the safeguards are binding on the Bank’s staff and they are also 
mandatory for its borrowers2. The safeguards then shape and guide the negotiations over 
development finance agreements among the World Bank, its borrowers and private investors. As 
a result, officially, the ESF governs the projects funded by the World Bank, but it does not create 
general legal obligations for the states in the same way as treaties or customs do. In doctrinal 
terms, the safeguards only create legal effects through the implementation of financing 
agreement(s) to which the World Bank is a party.  
 
However, this is only a fraction of influence that the World Bank’s rules have on law in practice. 
Because of its role in shaping project finance, the ESF also shapes the implementation of 
international law in certain sensitive areas such as environment, investment, labour and human 
rights. In practice, development projects are the precise instances where the ‘rubber hits the 
road’, i.e. where international law sets a concrete standard of protection for a given group of 
people in a given territory. Environmental, social and economic commitments have to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
‘Empowering the Inspection Panel: the impact of the World Bank’s new Environmental and Social 
Safeguards’, (2017) 49 (3) New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 921-58.  
2 The World Bank ESF (01 October 2018), World Bank Environmental and Social Policy for Investment 
Project Financing, para. 1, 5.  
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reconciled and weighed against one another in each and every development project. In the midst 
of these tensions, the safeguards dictate to the negotiating parties which conditions and 
commitments matter in each instance, and also to what extent. In that sense, the ESF captures a 
practice-oriented standard of authoritative behaviour set by international legal obligations, not 
only for the staff of the Bank but also for its borrowing states as well as private partners.  
 
The second way in which the World Bank’s influences international law is through diffusion of 
its safeguards, and their informal acceptance into other international legal regimes and eventually 
into domestic laws. Building on the existing research in international relations, Dann & Riegner 
in their contribution to this Symposium show that ‘the Safeguards had become a globally 
diffused normative model for socially and environmentally sound development’ (Dann & 
Riegner). This means that as well as interacting with existing norms of international law and 
reframing them for the purpose of individual development projects, the ESF is likely to give rise 
to new norms and/or to trigger reinterpretation of existing rules in international law more 
generally. This explains why a number of papers in this Symposium examine the way in which 
the ESF has integrated the existing and emerging international legal standards, such as the Core 
Labour Standards (CLS), Consultation and Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), and access 
to land, among others. Most of the authors also underline the problematic link between the 
World Bank safeguards and human rights (e.g. Mares, Cabrera & Ebert, Brunori), since the ESF 
is likely to solidify but also dilute some of the (emerging) norms that govern the position of 
individuals and groups in public international law, thus making it more difficult to tackle these 




The third way in which the ESF reform is relevant to international lawyers concerns its capacity 
to represent the status quo, and also the evolution of global governance. For instance, an 
extensive public debate surrounding the ESF revealed the level of environmental and social 
standards that developing states are currently willing to internalise and comply with. The process 
of arriving at the ESF is also a reflection of certain recent trends of rule-making in global 
governance, where an institutional set-up of an international organisation is used as an alternative 
to traditional law-making methods via treaty and/or COP decisions. Dann & Riegner capture this 
quality of the ESF reform eloquently by calling it a ‘looking glass’ of the global order. This 
means that the ESF, with its rich, heated and well-documented deliberation process, allows us to 
glance at some of the deeper shifts that are currently taking place in international law and 
governance.  
 
The contributions to this Symposium each capture a different element of this ‘reflection’ of 
global order by engaging with various innovations of the ESF.  They examine the shift towards 
‘democratisation’ of international institutions (Houghton), the level of international protection 
accorded to workers and indigenous peoples (Cabrera & Ebert), the attitude to international 
regulation of land-related issues (Brunori), the level of tolerance to human rights-related risks in 
investment and economic development (Mares), and the changing nature of multilateralism 
(Dann & Riegner). The rest of this introductory piece will outline some of these key shifts 
identified by the authors in their original research, also underlining the impacts that the ESF 





2. Intra-institutional law-making 
 
The pathway of creating the ESF is an illustration of two developments that are becoming 
commonplace in modern international law: institutionalisation of global politics, and the rise of 
non-state actors. The two seem to be closely interlinked, because they both have a limiting effect 
on the decision-making powers of sovereign states and the extent to which their ‘voice’ matters 
in global politics. To be sure, it would be naïve to claim that western donors such as the US 
allowed an ‘open’ global debate about contentious issues of development without maintaining a 
relative control over the content and the general outcomes of the reform. For instance, it was 
probably safe for these donors to assume that some of the most influential international NGOs 
will adhere to a liberal ideology3; or that the Bank’s staff, notwithstanding their widely construed 
prerogatives, will protect a predominantly neoliberal outlook of development4. In that sense, the 
process of arriving at the safeguards’ reform seems to not so much curtailed the ‘voice’ of the 
donor countries, as it enabled a productive alignment between their agenda, and that of the non-
state actors. 
 
Even with such caveats in mind, the ESF reform presents a departure from the more traditional 
template of inter-state law-making. Differently than the classic, inter-state model of treaty 
negotiations, which is based on the representation of geographical and political constituencies, 
the intra-institutional model of rule-making leading up to the ESF was specifically tailored to the 
interests of different stakeholders within the sustainable development debate. Indeed, the ESF 
                                                          
3 For an exposition of a relationship between the donor states, the Bank and civil society, see M. van Putten, 
Policing the Banks. Accountability Mechanisms for the Financial Sector (2008, McGill-Queen’s University Press).   
4 For a good overview of the Bank’s governing structure and the changing meaning of ‘development’ see generally 
Dann, The Law of Development Cooperation (2013, Cambridge University Press);  
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was never presented as a quest for a ‘deal’ acceptable to all, or even a majority of states. Instead, 
the ESF reform was packaged as a global deliberation, which was meant to satisfy civil society, 
indigenous and local communities, academics, business representatives, and borrowing as well as 
donor states. It is important to understand that the very possibility of such intra-institutional 
deliberation offers an alternative to a traditional process that would lead to a binding legal 
framework, and that this alternative was chosen instead of negotiating a subsequent treaty or a 
treaty-based amendment. Arguably, given the many difficulties involved in the classic inter-state 
law-making process, such intra-institutional route is likely to be utilised with increasing 
intensity. It is therefore important to gain further understanding of what is at stake in choosing 
this alternative, including the pitfalls and advantages that it entails. 
 
Ruth Houghton’s paper in this Symposium exposes the deficiencies of such intra-institutional 
rule-making, by invoking the conceptual framework of deliberative democracy to assess the 
legitimacy of the ESF rule-making process.  Building on Habermas’ theory and also the insights 
of his critics, Houghton discusses the core elements of deliberative democracy – people, public 
sphere, deliberation, and decision-making – and the way that they were construed by the Bank in 
the context of the ESF. Houghton’s analysis is two-fold: one the one hand, she questions the 
value of democratic analogy for the understanding of decision-making processes at the global 
level. On the other hand, she uses the benchmark of democratic decision-making to uncover the 
systemic issues and the power dynamic that were at play in the ESF process.  
 
In her findings Houghton shows how the Bank continued acting as an interface for deliberation 
at all times throughout the reform, without ever letting go of control over decision-making, nor 
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enabling the stakeholders to discuss contentious issues directly, rather than through the Bank. 
The ‘weight’ of input by different stakeholders also depended on the future benefits that a given 
stakeholder can create for the institution, more so than the validity of their arguments. For 
instance, Houghton demonstrates that countries with the greatest borrowing capacity (such as 
India or China) had the most space to provide input and shape the final outcome of the reform, 
despite civil society playing relatively prominent role at the early stages of agenda-setting of the 
reform. Here, Houghton’s work highlights the idea that international institutions are more than 
sites for contestation between different groups of countries. Rather, they also have an agenda and 
agency of their own, through which they seek to protect the institution’s interests and role in 
global politics. The broader message of Houghton’s contribution is that the intra-institutional 
route of rule-making, even if it contains such extensive consultations as were used for the ESF, 
can silence the dissenting voices whilst at the same time creating an impression of taking them 
seriously. 
 
3. The price of institutional legitimacy 
 
While Ruth Houghton’s paper appraises the process legitimacy of the ESF law-making, Franz 
Christian Ebert & Maria Victoria Cabrera Ormaza focus on the substance of the ESF and its 
impacts on organisational legitimacy. Their argument is based on the premise that by updating 
the ESF the World Bank responded to increasing ‘legitimacy demands’ from the borrowing 
states on the one hand, and the human rights-oriented audiences on the other. These demands 
conflict, because they ‘pull’ the ESF towards greater deference to borrowing state’s sovereignty 
on the one hand, and more effective ways of preventing negative human rights impacts and 
8 
 
increasing participation of affected groups on the other. Since the Bank had to enhance its 
legitimacy vis-à-vis both of these audiences in order to compete in a changing environment of 
development finance, it adopted various strategies of ‘decoupling’. Decoupling enabled the Bank 
‘to correspond to different legitimacy demands while leaving its core activities largely 
unaffected’ (Ebert & Cabrera).   
 
One such strategy identified by Ebert & Cabrera is to ‘decouple’ the discourse advanced by the 
ESF from its actual content. This means including more statements proclaiming better social and 
environmental standards, whilst at the same time backing them with no concrete policy tools 
needed for their implementation. In their analysis of how the ESF incorporates current 
international law standards on labour and indigenous peoples, the authors identify techniques 
through which such decoupling operates. For instance, a key technique – also discussed by Dann 
& Riegner – concerns deference to domestic legal frameworks of the borrowing states, allowing 
for them to take precedence over the international legal standards, such as the CLS. Here, a 
universal standard is made contingent on the domestic laws, potentially leading to diverging 
understanding of the same international provision in different countries. This is relevant for a 
wider discussion in international law because ‘re-articulation of the key concepts at stake’, as 
argued by Ebert & Cabrera, can lead to inconsistent understandings of human rights standards 
and weaken their normativity more generally. 
 
The analysis advanced by Ebert & Cabrera is significant because it points towards alternative 
battlefields taking place over the content of international law. In addition to treaty-making and 
judicial disputes one must also take into consideration these intra-institutional arenas, where 
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international law is not only re-articulated through an internal policy of international institution 
but is also left for further interpretation and application by the ‘in-house’ lawyers of international 
organisations. The argument by Ebert & Cabrera also shows that at least in the context of 
international financial institutions, the strategies of legitimation are elastic, and their outcome is 
contingent on political and economic concerns of a given institution. In case of the ESF, the price 
of substantive legitimacy demanded by the civil society activists and/or donor countries has 
proven to be too high. As a result, their legitimacy demands were accommodated through 
‘empty’ statements without much actual policy content, which might nonetheless at least 
partially increase organisational legitimacy of the Bank vis-à-vis human rights-oriented 
audiences. On the other hand, the legitimacy demands from emerging economies with significant 
borrowing powers were of crucial financial importance to the Bank. Hence, a lot of leeway was 
created for these countries to eschew the more stringent requirements of human rights 
protections that might have already existed or were emerging in other areas of international law. 
 
4. Selective ‘hardening’ of the ‘soft law’ standards 
 
One area where the World Bank’s approach is advanced relative to many other international 
regimes is access to land. Given that currently the binding sources of international law in this 
area are extremely limited, the ESF contains a rather stringent procedural framework, which is 
also advanced in a sense that it recognises multiple functions of land, its social value, its role in 
the life of indigenous peoples, and the fact that not all land rights might be derived formally. 
Generally, the Bank had to deal with issues related to land in its projects since at least the 1980s, 
which in turn lead to an elaborate ‘home-grown’ intra-institutional regime in this area.  Then, in 
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the context of the ESF, the Bank had to merge its own rules and past experiences with external 
evolving standards on land issues. In that regard, including the existing and emerging soft law 
standards on land  into the ESF enables their ‘hardening’ over time.  
 
This impact of the ESF on the on-going international debate about land rights is examined by 
Margherita Brunori in her contribution to this Symposium. She identifies two core dimensions of 
emerging international standard of access to land: security and equity. By comparing the 
provisions of the ESF with some of the milestone developments in international debate about 
land, Brunori shows that the Bank’s approach to security of land rights is attuned with other 
international instruments. It is therefore likely that the ESF will further consolidate the emerging 
standards in this area, such as the relevant provisions in the Voluntary Guidelines of Responsible 
Governance of Tenure adopted by the Committee on the World Food Security (CFS). 
 
On the other hand, in her research Brunori shows that the position of the ESF on the equitable 
access to land is considerably more cautious. For instance, there are some references made in the 
ESF to the equitable benefit-sharing with project-affected communities, but all related 
requirements are presented in a vague language. The borrowers therefore have a wide discretion 
to interpret their precise meaning. Generally, by examining some relevant human rights 
jurisprudence and also other soft law instruments such as Mo’otzkuxtal Voluntary Guidelines 
adopted under the Convention of Biodiversity, Brunori paints a nuanced picture of the Bank’s 
approach to access to land. Land-related provisions in the ESF are both, progressive and 




Another area where the ESF is likely to have an impact on emerging international law standards 
concerns the assessment of social risks in the context of economic development, including the 
issue of human rights due diligence. This topic is explored by Radu Mares, who examines the 
ESF as one of the three relevant instruments in this area, the other two being International 
Finance Corporation’s (IFC) Performance Standards and the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights (UNGP). Mares sets the scene for his analysis by explaining the institutional 
differences between the UNGP framework, and that of the ESF/IFC Performance Standards. He 
underlines the fact that the World Bank Group (the World Bank and IFC together) has a self-
standing capacity to enforce the emerging standards of human rights due diligence that does not 
rely on the good will of the business enterprises and member states, as in case of the UNGPs. 
This capacity, based on the economic power and availability of financial resources of the World 
Bank Group, differentiates the ESF and the IFC’s Performance Standards from other instruments 
developed in this area and explains why these instruments have greater authority to condition the 
behaviour of states and private entities. 
 
Mares identifies a key issue that the ESF does not make a distinction between the social impacts 
of development finance, and the impact that development finance might have on human rights. 
This distinction warrants conceptual clarity and, according to Mares, it should be based on the 
fact that differently than social impacts, human rights are meant to set a minimal threshold of 
human dignity. Therefore, whilst it is generally accepted that some negative social impacts are 
acceptable in the context of development projects, the same logic of tolerance to ‘residual 
impacts’ should not be permitted in the area of human rights. Mares then  analyses the notions of 
‘avoidance’ of harm and ‘mitigation’ of adverse impact, in order to explain what ‘not tolerating 
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residual impacts’ means conceptually and in practice  The underlying argument of Mares’ paper 
is that prevention should be taken more seriously in the context of negative economic impacts on 
human rights, and the notion of human rights due diligence in the UNGPs can be further 
developed by including new parameters. According to him, prevention should be understood as 
‘reduction at source’ and thus tackled at the level of designing financial intervention and 
throughout the project, to properly addresses the consequences of economic development. 
Similar to Brunori, Mares shows that the World Bank Group has the capacity to ‘upgrade’ the 
existing soft law standards in this area. Accordingly, the choice of not addressing human rights 
in the ESF gives more discretion for the borrowers to opt for mitigation and compensation 
measures, rather than trying to ensure a more effective prevention of human rights violations. 
 
Overall, in terms of substantive legitimacy, Ebert & Cabrera, Brunori and Mares all demonstrate 
two motions that are at play in the ESF. Firstly, depending on the strategic importance of a given 
provision to the interests of the Bank, the ESF either dilutes or enhances the existing standards of 
international law. The latter is particularly true for the ‘softer’ end of the soft law normative 
spectrum. Secondly, there is a certain level of ambiguity deliberately built into the ESF, which 
creates an opportunity for the Bank to expand or shrink the discretion of the borrowers, 
depending on their economic power to resist the more stringent interpretations of the ESF.  
 
5. The winners and losers of the ESF reform 
 
The issue of normative differentiation between the borrowing countries is tackled by Dann & 
Riegner in their contribution. As mentioned previously, Dann & Riegner approach the ESF as a 
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‘looking glass’ of contemporary global governance. They use the ESF in comparison with 
previous safeguards of the Bank, in order to appraise the changes that took place in the structure 
of international law and governance over the last few decades. The authors examine how certain 
key concepts of international law such as sovereignty, responsibility and international authority 
were reconfigured throughout the evolution of the Bank’s safeguards, including the impacts that 
the safeguards had on other regimes of international law. The key shift noted by Dann & Riegner 
is towards a ‘more competitive multilateralism’. In this changing set-up, global norms that 
condition states behaviour are no longer set by the US as a dominant global power but are also 
influenced by emerging powers such as BRICS. These countries gain their influence because of 
their capacity to do both; to borrow from traditional institutions such as the World Bank, and to 
establish new institutions such as Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in order to compete with 
traditional funders.  
 
As illustrated by Dann & Riegner, but also Ebert & Cabrera and Houghton, these rising 
economies are probably the main ‘winners’ of the ESF reform. That is because the new ESF 
potentially enables them to opt out from the regime of the World Bank safeguards, and to invoke 
instead the equivalent provisions of environmental and social protection in their domestic legal 
systems, provided that they can prove to have sufficient administrative capacity to replace the 
ESF with domestic law.  
 
At first sight this might appear as a reasonable ‘legal graduation strategy’ for the states with 
sufficient economic and administrative capacity. After all, none of the environmental and social 
standards set in the ESF are applicable to the donor countries, which is why it might be difficult 
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to justify the need for such international standards to govern fast-growing economies of 
developing countries. However, this is a ‘race to the bottom’ argument that is bound to facilitate 
further diffusion of social and environmental safeguards at the international level.  In fact, the 
ESF is a representation of processes visible across the wider terrain of international law, where 
countries are backtracking from the international standards of social and environmental 
protection and are invoking their domestic legal systems to justify such a move (see for instance, 
a debate over a ‘domestic bill of rights’ as a replacement of the ECHR in the UK). The claim 
here is that domestic legal framework is equivalent to (or even furnishes a better level of 
protection than) the one at the international level. Dann & Riegner acutely calls this the ‘ultimate 
victory of the Bank’s good governance agenda’, emphasising the fact that the particular way of 
delineating ‘good states’ from ‘bad states’ based on their administrative capacity and the 
‘quality’ of their legal system was also first introduced and advocated by the World Bank. 
 
In addition to diluting the level of protection accorded to individuals and sub-state groups, the 
‘dark side’ of this reliance on the borrowers’ framework is that it creates yet another vehicle of 
differentiation among developing countries. Depending on their economic and administrative 
capacity, developing countries are either subjected to international authority such as the one 
projected by the ESF, or they are free to exercise their national discretion. This difference, in 
turn, creates an ever greater and more complex distinction in the international legal order 
between the countries that are norm-takers, and those that are norm-givers.   
